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Abstract  
 
The present paper is an attempt to build up a framework which can holistically analyse the 
performance of governments bringing in the financial parameters as well as service delivery. We 
propose a three step methodology capturing different aspects of performance, integrated in the 
same framework. We generate the expenditure efficiency scores of governments based on 
expenditure and service delivery, applying non parametric Data Envelopment Analysis in the 
first step. This also enables us to identify the possible sources of mis-utilisation of resources on 
different expenditure heads. The second step consists of a detailed assessment of fiscal patterns 
of governments with Principal Component Analysis based on revenue, demand, cost, socio-
demographic, expenditure-adequacy and service-adequacy indicators. The components generated 
in the second step can also explain the differences in efficiency scores in resource utilization 
generated in the first step. Also, each step can generate ranks for the governments. A composite 
rank from both the steps can act as an index of overall performance of the governments. The 
methodology is applied to the urban local governments of the state of Tamil Nadu to get some 
insightful results. 
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1. Introduction 
 Analysis of fiscal health of governments is one of the most complex challenges faced 
by public finance specialists. Irrespective of the political or constitutional definition of a nation, 
subnational governments are almost never self-sufficient financially. Their revenue-raising 
capacities fall short of their expenditure responsibilities which can force them to rely on 
financial transfers from the upper tiers of government. Fiscal decentralization leaves states 
and municipalities with different financial abilities to provide public services to their citizens. 
Different jurisdictions will have different needs and costs of providing public services and 
different revenue-raising capacities with which to finance them. As a consequence, 
intergovernmental transfers usually have an equalizing element to them, with higher per 
capita transfers going to jurisdictions with lower fiscal capacities. The extent of equalization 
differs considerably across nations. However, economic principles alone cannot suffice to 
determine the ideal system of intergovernmental transfers. Literature suggests that there is 
no “optimal” set of intergovernmental transfers that suits all circumstances. Instead, grants 
have to be tailored in each case depending on the objectives sought, the initial conditions, 
and resource constraints.  
Intergovernmental transfers can be designed on the basis of fiscal gaps which 
measure the difference between the expenditure needs and revenue capacities of a 
government. In this approach, service delivery is considered implicitly through expenditure 
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needs and the emphasis is on the financial parameters explicitly. The extent of accuracy of 
estimation of fiscal gap can determine the extent of optimality in allocation of grants. 
However, there are methodological hurdles in estimating the fiscal gaps as they have to be 
estimated as the difference between two ideals. Correct expenditure needs estimations 
depend upon the availability of ideal standards of services for a jurisdiction which is 
rarelyavailable. For revenue raising capacities, accurate estimations can be made only if we 
have information on the revenue base, with the desired levels of bifurcations. These 
problems become more complex at the city level as we have a very heterogeneous revenue 
base and differences in service delivery assignments across cities. For Indian cities, the 
expenditure needs estimation becomes particularly difficult due to the presence of 
considerable shares of expenditures apart from those in services for which norms cannot be 
defined. 
Literature has also proposed the practice of achieving result-based accountability 
through performance oriented transfers. The objective of this kind of grant is to ensure quality 
and access to public services in a simple yet transparent and incentive compatible manner. It 
links the grant finance with service delivery performance. These transfers are subject to 
satisfying a set of conditions providing full flexibility in the design of performance. These 
conditions are designed to make policy, administration and governance effective so that it 
can ensurethat the necessary financial abilities are generated to achieve the performance 
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goals.  The manager of the programs faces greater incentive as the grant is based on the 
output. In this approach, the financial parameters are implicit and come through the 
conditions put forward for allocation of grants. It can preserve autonomy, encourage 
competition and innovation and bring accountability for results to residents. But the problem 
with this approach is that the economics of the service provision is not spelt out clearly.  
The present paper is an attempt to build up a framework which can holistically 
analyse the performance of governments bringing in the financial parameters as well as 
service delivery. We do not go via the fiscal gap route, nor do we consider service delivery 
levels as independent measures to assess performance, with certain conditions on reforms 
met to ensure that the necessary governance, administrative and fiscal parameters are in 
place. Instead, we propose a three step methodology capturing different aspects of 
performance, integrated in the same framework.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of literature to 
contextualize the problem, relating it to theory in public finance in general and practice in 
Indian sub nationalpolicy in particular and justifies why we need to think about an alternative 
framework of performance evaluation of governments. Section 3 elaborates on the new 
methodology of performance assessment. Section 4 offers the results of application of this 
methodology to the urban local bodies (ULBs) of the state of Tamil Nadu in India. Section 5 
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gives the policy implications and concluding remarks. The results are tabulated in a separate 
Annexure. The technical notes are given in an Appendix. 
2. The Context: Theory and Practice 
Traditional public finance theory identifies fiscal gap as an indicator of performance of 
a government unit which is widely used for all practical purposes. Expenditure need is the 
expenditure needed to provide the minimum acceptable levels of services which the 
government is responsible to provide for the citizens.For measuring expenditure needs, the 
two methods mainly used are the representative expenditure system using direct imputation 
method and theory based representative expenditure system. The former is done by dividing 
sub national expenditures into various functions, determining expenditure by each jurisdiction 
for each function, identifying relative need, assigning relative weights using direct imputation 
methods or regression analysis and allocating total expenditures of each jurisdiction for each 
function and across jurisdictions. The latter uses a conceptual framework that embodies an 
appropriately defined concept of fiscal need and properly specified expenditure function, 
estimated using objective quantitative analysis. Sometimes, simple summation of expenditure 
norms on different service delivery functions is also done to calculate expenditure need, 
norms being based on expert opinion. 
 Fiscal capacity of a government can be measured by representative tax system 
approach which measures the fiscal capacityof a state by the revenue that could be raisedif 
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the government employed all the standard sources at the nation-wide average intensity of 
use.The method involves three major steps. First, for each tax, an appropriate base has to 
be identified. This base should not be the base which is recorded in official tax statistics, 
rather it should be the base that can be taken to be the representative of relative taxable 
capacity.Second, a set of representative tax rate which can be constituted as representative 
tax system need to be generated. This representative of the tax may be derived as the 
average of the effective rates of that tax, where the effective rates are defined as the ratio of 
actual collection to the potential base.Third, the average effective rate (AER) is calculated as 
the weighted average of the effective rates, weights being the respective shares of taxes. 
 The products of AER and the potential base of a tax will indicate the revenue which 
the concerned government could raise from that source if its potential is used to the average 
extent.So the sum of the product over all revenue sources will be the estimated revenue 
capacity of the government. 
In Regression or stochastic approach the relation between tax ratio capacity factors 
and effort factors are estimated from data. The actual tax ratio depends on the ability of the 
people to pay taxes, the ability of the administration to collect taxes and the willingness of the 
government to tax. The factors affecting first two components are termed as tax capacity 
factors and the factors affecting the third component are tax effort factors.So the variation of 
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tax ratio can be explained by a regression analysis where tax ratio is taken as the dependent 
variable and indicators of tax capacity and tax effort factors as dependent variables. 
Alternatively, an attempt can be made to quantify and isolate the tax capacity factors 
on the tax ratio, so that the measure of the tax effort of the government will be derived on the 
basis of residuals. The average degree of the relationship between the tax ratio and what are 
identified as the taxable capacity factors may be derived through multiple regression analysis. 
The difference between the actual tax ratio in a jurisdiction and that estimated on the basis of 
tax capacity equation would be the unexplained variance component and may be attributed to 
tax efforts.  But getting robust estimates are hard in reality. 
From the above discussion it is clear that fiscal gap estimation requires huge 
information for accuracy in calculation. Both revenue capacity and expenditure needs are 
conceptually interesting but very hard to estimate without a substantial amount of data and 
information, which is generally neitheravailable,nor can be collected at the levels of dis-
aggregation required. The other alternative which assesses the performance through levels of 
services can prove to be incentive incompatible once the ‘inputs’ are taken into account to 
achieve these outputs. Recent changes in outlook in Indian policies are tilted more towards 
performance based methods and stresses on the point of incentive-compatibility, somewhat 
ignoring the link between the potential role of inputs to produce these outcomes  
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Let us take the case for grants to urban local bodies. In India, the Thirteenth Central 
Finance Commission (13th FC) for the first time proposed performance based grants to 
ULBs.The 13th FC for the first time also recommended that the grant should come from the 
central taxes by creating a divisible pool.Earlier, in the 10th, 11th and in the 12th Finance 
Commission, the ULBs used to get “ad-hoc” grants. 
The 13th FC has recommended three types of grants for the ULBs-general basic grant 
(which would be 1.5 per cent of the divisible pool in the previous year); general performance 
grant (which would be upto 1 per cent of the divisible pool) and the special area grant 
(where Rs. 20 per capita per year has been allotted for the first four years). 
The performance based grant would only be allowed if certain conditions are met. 
These are: 
1. Constituting the property tax board which in states will assist the ULBs in having 
transparent practices for property tax levies. 
2. All ULBs should be fully empowered to levy property tax. 
3. Constitution of the local ombudsman who would take care of complaints regarding 
improper administration. 
4. Benchmarks should be put for four major services-water supply, sewerage, storm 
water drains and solid waste management 
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5. State government should put audit system in ULB. 
6. State governments should ensure electronic transfer of grants for ensuring 
transparency in the system.  
7. Introduction of supplement to budget document 
8. Prescribing qualifications to SFC members through an ACT 
9.  Putting in place fire hazard response and mitigation plan 
 
If we analyse these conditions carefully we find that they aim to strengthen the 
revenue base of ULBs and put checks and measures on issues related to audit and 
governance for an efficient system of service delivery. The financial aspect which was not 
explicitly taken care of in the performance based measures of governments through service 
delivery is incorporated through a set of conditions on the basis of which grants are to be 
allocated.  However, mere satisfaction of these conditions would not tell us anything about 
the financial resources used to provide services.In order to have a clear idea about the 
economic model behind better service delivery, we need to approach in a different way. 
One point needs to be mentioned here. The Ministry of Urban Development came up 
with a framework for service level benchmarking to facilitate the process and make the 
recommendations of thirteenth finance commission workbetter. Figure 1 explains the 
framework in a schematic diagram. 
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It is interesting to note that this framework recognizes the existence of an implicit 
economic model associated with the framework which is based on the principles of 
production and cost. But this model is never addressed while policies are formulated or 
evaluated. This might leave a caveat in the entire process. 
 
Figure 1 Service Level Benchmarking Framework 
 
In what follows we deal with the caveats of the two approaches of assessing 
performance of governments in an intellectual framework. We pick up the loose strings from 
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performance based policy formulations based on service level benchmarking and attempt to 
offer a framework to estimate a performance indicator of ULBs which can be economically 
justified and analysed.  We alsocome up with an alternative methodology of estimating the 
fiscal patterns incorporating different class of variables which are likely to affect it. This 
methodology demands lesser information or to be more precise, can be designed by making 
the best use of whatever information is available. We show that performance in service 
delivery and that in fiscal health are not independent of each other.  These two measures are 
complimentary and can be combined to get a better sense of performance of governments.  
 
3. Methodological Statement 
We propose a three step methodology to build up this framework with an objective of 
assessing efficiency in expenditure management and service delivery as well as incorporate 
different categories of variables in assessing fiscal health in a holistic manner.  
The first step builds up the economic model behind services provision in a simple 
production-cost framework. We generate the resource utilization efficiency scores of 
government units based on expenditure and service delivery data applying non parametric 
Data Envelopment Analysis. This step also helps us to identify the possible sources of mis-
utilisation of resources on different expenditure heads to achieve the levels of services. 
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However, this analysis focuses on the role of expenditures and service delivery in evaluating 
performance and leaves out a set of important determinants of fiscal health.  
The second step consists of a detailed analysis of fiscal health of the government 
units with Principal Component Analysis based on resource, demand, cost, service-adequacy 
and expenditure-adequacy indicators which are important for the analysis of fiscal health. 
This step gives clear indications regarding which variables or set of variables constructed into 
components explain the maximum variability in the fiscal health parameters across 
jurisdictions. We can identify and rank a set of components in order of their explanatory 
powers and can use them as instruments for further analysis. We can also combine the 
components into scores for each jurisdiction. 
A third step attempts to integrate the two facets of performance of governments and 
identifies a way to explore any kind of relationship between the efficiency scores in the first 
step and the principal determinants of fiscal health generated in the second step. This helps 
us to know whether the most important determinants of fiscal health are also important in 
explaining the resource utilization efficiency scores or not. This would guide us in 
understanding the relative importance of different sets of variables holistically.  
This analysis can also generate ranks for government units by assigning scores from 
each step. We propose to take a weighted average of the two sets of scores as the indicator 
of fiscal health of government, weights being determined on an objective criterion depending 
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upon the purpose of allocating intergovernmental transfers or any other task. For instance, if 
a grant has to be based on performance in service delivery, the first set of scores be more 
important and can be given more weightage than that of the second. The third step of the 
analysis can also guide us to assign weights to determinants of fiscal health in the second 
step to generate scores from Principal Component Analysis. 
This methodology is fairly general and can be applied to any level of government. In 
the present context, it is applied to the urban local governments of the state of Tamil Nadu to 
get some insightful results. 
 
Step 1 Estimating Efficiency Scores of Governments 
The first step involves computation of input-oriented technical efficiency scores of 
ULBs with expenditures of different categories as inputs and service levels as outputs. 
Our objective would be to attempt an in-depth analysis of performance taking a ULB 
as the decision making unit (DMU) by bringing in the expenditures on various accounts as 
inputs and provision of services as outputs. This analysis attempts to bring together the 
financial parameters and the service delivery of the ULBs in the spirits of Eeckaut et al 
(1993), De Borger et al (1994), Grossman et al (1999), Bandyopadhyay (2012) which 
analyse the efficiencies of ULBs in different countries or explain the factors affecting these 
efficiencies.  The main objective of our analysis is to assess the performance of the ULBs in 
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service delivery and resource utilization in an integrated manner. We also pinpoint the 
possible sources of resource savings by identifying the sources for mis-utilisation of 
resources and estimating the quantum of resources mis-utilised which was first attempted 
forthe municipal sector in Karnataka in Bandyopadhyay (2012).  
The justification for using non parametric DEA is that it requires only behavioral 
assumptions on the production technology which are very basic. Also, DEA performs well 
even with moderate sized data. The formulation of standard DEA problem is discussed in 
detail in CCR (1978), BCC (1984) and in the present context in Bandyopadhyay (2012).  
 Both CCR (1978) and BCC(1984) models calculate only radial (in) efficiency. For 
radial and slack calculation together one has to use an extended formulation based on BCC 
(1984). Radial measures are preferred as they can be used to measure radial efficiency and 
can also estimate off-radial slacks in an integrated multi-stage methodology. The input 
version of the efficiency models is particularly useful here because the main purpose of this 
analysis is to focus on the expenditure management of ULBs. A note on the technique with a 
diagrammatic and mathematical formulation is given in the Appendix.  
Step 2 Assessment of Fiscal Patterns of Governments 
 The second step of our methodology consists of application of Principal Component 
Analysis to assess the overall fiscal health of the ULBs. Before we describe the technique, 
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we would like to spell out why at all we need this step. The analysis of performance based 
on efficiency scores in step one only incorporates the expenditures as inputs but there are 
many factors that might affect service delivery. For that matter, there are factors that can 
affect expenditures too which indirectly can affect service delivery. We can define variables 
on different aspects of revenue generation, demand, cost, socio-demographic, expenditure- 
adequacy and service-adequacy which affect the performance of a jurisdiction in some way 
or the other. Also, the efficiency scores derived in the first step are deterministic in nature. To 
make it amenable to statistical inferences and determine the nature of relationship between 
the variables which cannot be included in deriving these scores, we need to extend the 
analysis in the first step. If we can come up with a set of variables that represent best the 
factors affecting fiscal health, we can regressthe efficiency scores on these variables to get 
an idea about the nature of relationship between the two categories of indicators of 
performance formulated in the paper. 
There can be too many factors which can help to study fiscal patterns of 
governments. Also, in a large set of variables, some of the variables may be correlated. 
While too many variables may lead to incorrect inferences, correlation among the variables 
can also lead to problems of imprecise estimations. Without dropping any of the variables, 
we can come up with constructs which best represent the data by explaining most of the 
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variability. Data reduction through principal component analysis can be applied for this 
purpose.  After the data reduction process is complete, the reduced components, devoid of   
high correlations, can be used to derive scores for each observation in the dataset which 
once normalized can be used for ranking.The weights can be assigned from the respective 
eigenvalues attached with the components. The components can also be used as 
explanatory variables to be used in regressions to explain the variability in efficiency scores. 
A note on the Principal Component technique is given in the Appendix. 
Step 3 Integrating Efficiency and Fiscal Patterns of Governments 
 We can add a third step to complete the analysis. This step integrates the two 
measures of performance. A regression analysis can be done to check the relation between 
the efficiency scores derived in the first step and the components derived in the second step. 
This way we get to know which category of fiscal variables are statistically significant in 
explaining (in)efficiencies. We can rank these categories of variables according to the 
statistical levels of significances to find the relative strengths of each in explaining efficiencies 
of governments,even if they are not statistically significant . 
We can also generate a composite index with the efficiency scores and the principal 
component scores to assess the overall performance of a government unit. This score can be 
used in assessing the overall performance of governments.  We can adjust the weight of the 
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index from each method according to the purpose of generating this score. For instance, if 
the scores are generated for allocation of grants, for a performance grant, efficiency related 
component can be given a higher weight whereas for other purposes the fiscal health 
component can be given a higher weight 
4. An Application to the Urban Local Bodies in Tamil Nadu  
The above methodology is applied to the municipal sector in the state of Tamil Nadu. 
The urban sector in the state of Tamil Nadu is huge with 10 Corporations, 149 municipalities 
and 559 town panchayats. We take all the 718 ULBs for our analysis. We use the data from 
Fourth State Finance Commission Report and work on the most recent data published there, 
i.e 2009-10. The results are tabulated in  tables 1-12 in the Annexure. 
The first step is executed as a multistage DEA with seven outputs and five inputs. 
Table 1 gives the description of the input and output variables used in the model. Table 2 
gives the summary statistics of the variables which shows considerable variation in the data 
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Table1  List of variables used in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Model 
Name of Variable Symbol Used 
Output 
Water supplied (in litres) Y1 
Waste Collected (in million tonnes) Y2 
Roads (km) Y3 
Storm Water Drains(in Km) Y4 
Street Light (in Number) Y5 
Public Convenience (in number) Y6 
Culverts & bridges(in numbers Y7 
Input 
Wages (Rs.) X1 
Establishment Expenses (Rs.) X2 
O&M Expenses (in Rs.) X3 
Capital Expenditure (in Rs.) X4 
Labor Cost (in Rs.) X5 
 
 
Table 2 Summary Statistics of Input and Output Variables Used in the DEA Model 
 
Variable 
No of 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
OUTPUTS 
Y1 718 1,180,000,000 3,550,000,000 1,825,000 
56,300,000,00
0 
Y2 718 4,327 17,269 2 269,261 
Y3 718 53 106 2 2,034 
 Y4 718 45 358 0 9,298 
Y5 718 1,533 5,643 87 132,527 
Y6 718 12 34 1 728 
Y7 718 80 199 1 2,271 
INPUTS X1 718 149,082 1,667,862 0 35,000,000 
X2 718 19,000,000 174,000,000 53,000 4,420,000,000 
X3 718 9,844,788 43,400,000 218,000 968,000,000 
X4 718 24,800,000 173,000,000 193,000 4,460,000,000 
X5 718 21,000,000 177,000,000 465,000 4,510,000,000 
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Table3 Efficiency Scores 
Summary 
Statistics 
All Corporation 
 
Grand Group 
Municipality 
 
Grand Group 
Town Panchayat 
 
GrandGroup 
Number of 
ULBs 
718                      
10 
                    
149 
                 
559 
 
Average 0.66 0.75 1 0.46 0.91 0.72 0.74 
 
Median 0.72 1 1 0.24 1 0.77 0.77 
 
The results of the efficiency analysis are quite interesting. Table 3 shows the 
summary statistics of efficiency scores for all the ULBs in the state as well as those for each 
category of ULB. We have run four sets of programs for estimating the efficiencies, one for 
all the 718 ULBs, one for the 10 corporations, one for the 149 municipalities and one for the 
559 town panchayats. The overall median efficiency score is 72 per cent which means the 
ULBs can Tamil Nadu cansave expenditures by 28 per cent and still provide the same levels 
of services. Corporations perform the best followed by town panchayats. Municipalities 
perform the worst. 
For each category of ULB there are two sets of scores reported in Table 3. The 
scoresreported in the ‘Grand’ column reports the score of the particular category when all the 
ULBs are considered to generate the ‘Grand’ frontier and the scores of eachcategory are 
grouped separately, The scores reported under column ‘Group’ are generated by running the 
DEA program for that particular category of ULBs only. For instance, for corporations, both 
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the Grand and Group medians are the same which means there is not much of a difference 
in the relative performances of the ‘corporations’ whether they are a part of the municipal 
sector as a whole or are considered separately as ‘corporations’for analyzing the 
performance. Same holds true for the ‘town panchayats’. But we observe a drastic difference 
in the performance scores of the ‘municipalities’ in the two columns. This means that the 
performance within the group and relative performance with ULBs outside the group vary a 
lot. This is indicative of the fact that the peers outside their own group perform better and this 
results in a lower relative efficiency of municipalities in the entire sector. This supports the 
growing concern for medium sized cities which fail to cope up with the ever-growing needs. 
The corporations are getting the benefits of scale, the town panchayats are getting the 
benefits of size but the municipalities are somewhat stuck. 
 
Table Slacks in inputs (%) 
Categories 
of ULBs 
Summary 
Statistics 
    
Wage
s 
Establish
ment 
Operations and 
Maintenance 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Labor
cost 
All Average 43 20.5 15.6 18.8 15.3 
  Median 42.8 15.5 10.1 14.4 10.2 
Corporation Average 3.79 12.28 2.59 27.42 11.63 
  Median 3.79 2.39 2.59 27.42 1.48 
Municipality Average 29.56 15.11 9.61 9.48 12.27 
  Median 20.42 12.05 6.8 4.92 8.92 
Town 
Panchayat Average 49.76 25.62 16.76 21.49 17.2 
  Median 45.16 21.3 11.45 17.23 12.6 
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Table 4: Analysis of Slacks in DEA Model (%) 
 
Categories of 
ULBs Summary Statistics     Wages Establishment 
Operations and 
Maintenance 
Capital 
Expenditure Laborcost 
All Average 43 20.5 15.6 18.8 15.3 
  Median 42.8 15.5 10.1 14.4 10.2 
Corporation Average 3.79 12.28 2.59 27.42 11.63 
  Median 3.79 2.39 2.59 27.42 1.48 
Municipality Average 29.56 15.11 9.61 9.48 12.27 
  Median 20.42 12.05 6.8 4.92 8.92 
Town Panchayat Average 49.76 25.62 16.76 21.49 17.2 
  Median 45.16 21.3 11.45 17.23 12.6 
 
 
Table 4 elaborates on the slacks in inputs which gives the quantum of additional 
savings on each input. This measures the off radial contractions in inputs associated with the 
envelope. We find that maximum cost savings can be done for the wages component (43 
per cent) and minimum for the labor cost component (10 per cent). Wages component is 
associated with the contractual labor in which there existscope for a lot of manipulations 
which is reflected through the model. We also find that the magnitudes of slacks are lower in 
the corporations but very high in the town panchayat category. This applies to all inputs 
excepting capital expenditures. Thus, mis-utilisation of resources in general is higher in the 
smallest category of cities. 
 The second step for generating components to study fiscal patterns is executed taking 
56 variables related to municipal finance and service delivery. We conceptualise a framework 
much discussed in public finance theory slightly modified for our need of the problem. We  
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Table 5 Variables Used in Principal Component Analysis 
 
variable Description Variable Description 
v1 Population v29 SFC as % of Transfer 
v2 Percentage share of population of ULB v30 Per Capita Transfers (in Rs.) 
v3 Percentage Share of area for ULBs v31 Residential Properties 
v4 Total slum population  v32 Commercial Properties 
v5 Population below poverty line  v33 Industrial Properties 
v6 Slum population as percentageof total population  v34 Total assessed properties 
v7 Population below poverty line as percentage of total 
population  
v35 Own Revenues as % of Revenue Expenditure 
v8 Area in (sq KMs) v36 Total Revenues as % of Total Expenditure 
v9 Density (persons per sq km) v37 Collection efficiency of property taxes (%) 
v10 Percentage of coverage of HPEC Financial (O&M) norm for 
water supply 
v38 Collection efficiency profession tax (%) 
v11
* 
Percentage of coverage of HPEC Financial (O&M) norm for 
roads 
v39 Collection efficiency of water charges (%) 
v12
* 
Percentage of coverage of HPEC Financial (O&M) norm for 
storm water drains 
v40 Road density (in km per sq km) 
v13 Percentage of coverage of HPEC Financial (O&M) norm for 
solid waste management 
v41 Per capita road length (in meters) 
v14 Percentage of coverage of HPEC Financial (O&M) norm for 
street lighting 
v42 Percentage of TN norm coverage for roads 
v15 Per Capita O&M water supply (in Rs.) v43 Percentage of road length covered by drains 
v16
* 
Per Capita O&M roads (in Rs.) v44 Percentage of TN norm covered for storm water 
v17
* 
Per Capita O&M storm water drains (in Rs.) v45 Percentage of coverage of HPEC norms for roads 
v18 Per capita O&M solid waste (in Rs) v46 Percentage of tube light 
v19 Per capita O&M street lighting (in Rs.) v47 Percentage of sodium vapour lamps 
v20 Percentage of water charges collected (for O&M cost of 
water supply 
v48 Percentageof TN norm coverage for tube light 
v21 Per Capita Tax (in Rs.) v49 Percentage of TN norm coverage for sodium lamps 
v22 Per Capita Non Tax (in Rs.) v50 Storage Capacity as percentage of water supply 
v23 Per Capita Own Rev (in Rs.) v51 Percentage of TN norm covered for water storage 
v24 Own Rev as % of Total Rev v52 Waste Collection Ratio-Waste Collected as % of waste 
generated per day-HPEC & TN norm is 100% collection 
v25 Per Capita Assigned Rev (in Rs.) v53 Per Capita Water Supply 
v26 Assign Rev as % of Transfer v54 Percentage of HPEC norms coverage for water supply-
135lpcd 
v27 Per Capita Grants (in Rs.) v55
* 
Percentage forTN  norm coverage for high mast lamps 
v28 Grants as % Total Transfers v56
* 
Percentage of high mast lamps 
*Variables dropped because of missing values 
 
intend to cover as many variables as we can as determinants of fiscal health and classify 
them as Cost, Demand, Socio-demographic, Revenues, Service-adequacy and Expenditure-
adequacy indicators. While revenues, socio-demographic, cost and demand categories are 
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straightforward1, we need to spell out how we define service-adequacy and expenditure-
adequacy indicators. There are certain norms on services corresponding to which financial 
Table 6Summary Statistics of Variables used in Principal Component Analysis 
 
Variables No. of 
Observations 
Mean SD Range Variables No. of 
Observations 
Mean SD Range 
v1 718 42295.7 205203.1 4997372.0 v31 718 7997.7 23500.0 525925.0 
v2 718 0.1 0.7 16.5 v32 718 1014.1 4015.0 96254.0 
v3 718 0.1 0.2 2.0 v33 718 107.6 554.7 10265.0 
v4 717 8409.7 33599.6 658546.0 v34 718 9193.4 27607.5 623332.0 
v5 716 7062.1 26795.1 430440.8 v35 718 56.4 47.1 991.9 
v6 718 21.6 14.1 96.5 v36 718 131.3 80.2 1583.1 
v7 717 16.5 12.1 76.3 v37 718 75.1 29.0 354.0 
v8 718 14.9 16.5 216.9 v38 718 90.2 17.2 136.0 
v9 718 2986.1 3650.4 28649.3 v39 718 78.2 24.4 97.9 
v10 718 48.3 38.9 344.0 v40 718 6.0 17.7 463.6 
v13 718 27.7 29.7 267.4 v41 718 2.1 1.3 12.2 
v14 718 2399.1 1797.8 23788.5 v42 718 118.7 75.1 698.6 
v15 718 139.2 103.9 840.6 v43 718 62.3 530.8 14152.1 
v18 718 31.8 34.4 302.1 v44 718 41.5 353.9 9434.7 
v19 718 75.5 52.6 713.3 v45 718 82.8 251.7 6622.5 
v20 718 47.2 51.4 1192.9 v46 718 75.9 15.3 96.7 
v21 718 204.6 248.9 3237.0 v47 718 15.2 11.8 95.0 
v22 718 233.3 319.5 7018.9 v48 718 19.0 14.8 118.7 
v23 718 437.9 514.2 9953.9 v49 718 117.1 91.1 730.8 
v24 718 30.5 13.2 72.1 v50 718 194.2 914.2 15330.4 
v25 718 97.4 152.2 2081.1 v51 718 588.4 2770.4 46455.8 
v26 718 12.4 11.1 82.6 v52 718 95.4 69.2 950.7 
v27 718 377.4 455.3 8136.2 v53 718 95.5 86.5 705.6 
v28 718 39.4 19.3 91.5 v54 718 70.8 64.1 522.7 
v29 718 49.0 17.8 90.4 v53 718 95.5 86.5 705.6 
v30 718 474.8 510.9 9655.4 v54 718 70.8 64.1 522.7 
 
 
Socio-demographic/Cost/Demand Variables: v1-v9 
Service Adequacy Variables:v10-v20 
Revenue related Variables: v21-v39 
Expenditure Adequacy Variables: v40-v54 
                                                          
1
 These classes  of variables which are considered to estimate expenditure needs and revenue capacities in the 
literature.  See Bandyopadhyay and Rao (2009) 
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norms are designed for different services according to size class of cities in India 
(HPEC2011). The government of Tamil Nadu also has designed some state level norms on 
similar lines. In the category of service-adequacy we have included those variables which are 
related to levels of services and also the coverage of norms on physical levels of services. 
Similarly, for expenditure-adequacy category we include variables on service wise 
expenditures and the coverage of financial norms for these services. The details of these 
variables are given in table 5.The summary statistics are presented in table 6. 
Table 7 Composition of Components* 
Components Variables 
1 V1, v2, v4, v5, v31, v32, v34 
2 V14, v19 
 3 V37, v38, v39 
4 V27, v28,v29, v30  
5 V46, V47, v48, v49 
6 V53, v54 
7 V21, v22, v23, v35 
8 V43, v44 
9 V40, v45 
10 V50, v51 
11 V10, v15 
12 V3, v8 
13 V13, v18 
14 V41, v42 
15 V6, v7 
16 V25, v26 
* Variables which are not a part of any component are: v9, v20, v24, v33, v36, v52 
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Our problem is one with 718 observations on 56 variables. We can look at it as 718 
observations in R56 space or 56 variables in R718 space. We could successfully construct 16 
components combining different subsets of 44 out of the 50 variables ultimately involved in 
the analysis explaining 84.12 per cent of the total variance in the data. We set the lower limit 
of eigenvalue to be 1 for selecting the components. The details of the 16 components for 
which eigenvalues are greater than one are given in table 7. The variances explained by 
each of these components are given in table 8. 
Table8:  Variance Explained by the Principal Components 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings
a
 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 8.567 17.134 17.134 8.567 17.134 17.134 7.868 
2 6.488 12.977 30.111 6.488 12.977 30.111 3.195 
3 3.400 6.800 36.911 3.400 6.800 36.911 3.204 
4 2.963 5.926 42.837 2.963 5.926 42.837 3.711 
5 2.804 5.608 48.445 2.804 5.608 48.445 4.284 
6 2.356 4.711 53.156 2.356 4.711 53.156 2.255 
7 2.162 4.324 57.48 2.162 4.324 57.48 4.208 
8 2.009 4.017 61.498 2.009 4.017 61.498 2.017 
9 1.961 3.921 65.419 1.961 3.921 65.419 2.111 
10 1.693 3.385 68.804 1.693 3.385 68.804 2.109 
11 1.534 3.067 71.872 1.534 3.067 71.872 2.392 
12 1.344 2.688 74.559 1.344 2.688 74.559 2.855 
13 1.286 2.571 77.13 1.286 2.571 77.13 3.386 
14 1.248 2.495 79.626 1.248 2.495 79.626 2.682 
15 1.182 2.365 81.99 1.182 2.365 81.99 1.375 
16 1.079 2.158 84.149 1.079 2.158 84.149 2.497 
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It is interesting to find that the variables belonging to the revenue category explains 
the maximum variance (25 per cent) followed by those in the expenditure adequacy category 
(24 per cent), service adequacy category (23 per cent) and Cost/demand/socio-
demographic category (12 per cent). It is clear that the revenue components are most 
prominent in explaining variances in fiscal health parameters. After revenues indicators, 
service-adequacy and expenditure-adequacy indicators are also more or less equally 
important. 
Our next task is to integrate the analysis in the first step and that in the second step. 
We would like to synthesize two approaches, one based on expenditure management and 
service delivery and the other based on a comprehensive set of aspects related to fiscal 
patterns.  We have looked at the same problem from two different angles. The first step 
derives fiscal health indices as expenditure efficiency scores in a non parametric framework. 
The second step derives the principal components as determinants of fiscal patterns out of 
variables apart from those which are included in the first step.  
We would first need to know whether the components can explain the differences in 
expenditure efficiency scores. If so, which set of variables plays the most important role in 
explaining them? We have done some preliminary OLS and Tobit regressions to see the 
relationships.  We have reported the results of four models. Two sets of OLS regressions are 
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attempted, one with the 16 components and the other with the 16 components and the 6 
excluded variables which are not a part of any of these 16 components but were considered 
in the principal component analysis. In a similar manner, two sets of Tobit regressions are 
also attempted. The results are reported below (table 9-table12). 
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Table 9 OLS Regression Model 1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     718 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 16,   701) =    9.60 
       Model |  662.937059    16  41.4335662           Prob> F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  3024.77818   701  4.31494747           R-squared     =  0.1798 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1610 
       Total |  3687.71524   717  5.14325696           Root MSE      =  2.0772 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
eeffi |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      FAC1_1 |   .1359365   .0890773     1.53   0.127    -.0389537    .3108268 
      FAC2_1 |  -.1286641   .0819158    -1.57   0.117    -.2894938    .0321656 
      FAC3_1 |     .71069   .0854379     8.32   0.000     .5429451    .8784348 
      FAC4_1 |   .0283999   .0795669     0.36   0.721    -.1278181    .1846178 
      FAC5_1 |   .1349812   .0825419     1.64   0.102    -.0270777    .2970401 
      FAC6_1 |  -.1728753    .079995    -2.16   0.031    -.3299339   -.0158168 
      FAC7_1 |   .1391205   .0827945     1.68   0.093    -.0234344    .3016754 
      FAC8_1 |   .0391849   .0776768     0.50   0.614     -.113322    .1916919 
      FAC9_1 |   .0198251   .0786196     0.25   0.801    -.1345331    .1741832 
     FAC10_1 |   .0561764   .0787604     0.71   0.476    -.0984581    .2108109 
     FAC11_1 |   .0258028    .079993     0.32   0.747    -.1312517    .1828573 
     FAC12_1 |   .0518306   .0835832     0.62   0.535    -.1122728    .2159339 
     FAC13_1 |   -.267513   .0842099    -3.18   0.002    -.4328468   -.1021792 
     FAC14_1 |  -.2788497   .0831877    -3.35   0.001    -.4421766   -.1155228 
     FAC15_1 |   .0393098   .0790865     0.50   0.619     -.115965    .1945846 
     FAC16_1 |   .0699974    .081174     0.86   0.389    -.0893758    .2293706 
       _cons |   7.844704   .0775221   101.19   0.000     7.692501    7.996908 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 10 OLS Regression Model 2 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     718 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 22,   695) =    8.42 
       Model |  776.188821    22    35.28131           Prob> F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2911.52642   695  4.18924664           R-squared     =  0.2105 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1855 
       Total |  3687.71524   717  5.14325696           Root MSE      =  2.0468 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
eeffi |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          v9 |  -.0001174   .0000424    -2.77   0.006    -.0002006   -.0000342 
         v24 |   .0254749   .0131816     1.93   0.054    -.0004056    .0513553 
         v33 |   .0002807   .0001861     1.51   0.132    -.0000848    .0006461 
         v36 |   .0059213   .0020691     2.86   0.004     .0018589    .0099836 
         v52 |  -.0025117   .0013932    -1.80   0.072    -.0052472    .0002237 
         v20 |  -.0014351   .0018828    -0.76   0.446    -.0051318    .0022615 
      FAC1_1 |   .3670314   .1254263     2.93   0.004     .1207716    .6132913 
      FAC2_1 |   .0355803   .1082089     0.33   0.742    -.1768753    .2480359 
      FAC3_1 |   .4802347   .1229713     3.91   0.000     .2387948    .7216746 
      FAC4_1 |  -.0285341   .1088706    -0.26   0.793    -.2422889    .1852207 
      FAC5_1 |   .1806832   .0829338     1.18   0.030     -.0178524    .3435141 
      FAC6_1 |  -.1226144   .0801747    -1.53   0.127    -.2800281    .0347993 
      FAC7_1 |   .4857807   .1760532     2.76   0.006     .1401208    .8314406 
      FAC8_1 |   .0388165   .0766085     0.51   0.613    -.1115954    .1892283 
      FAC9_1 |   .0525258   .0784296     0.67   0.503    -.1014616    .2065132 
     FAC10_1 |   .0164558   .0786083     0.21   0.834    -.1378825     .170794 
     FAC11_1 |   .0010848   .0974765     0.01   0.991     -.190299    .1924686 
     FAC12_1 |   .2154067   .1093239     1.97   0.049     .0007621    .4300514 
     FAC13_1 |  -.3571959   .1080681    -3.31   0.001    -.5693749   -.1450169 
     FAC14_1 |  -.1719154   .0932845    -1.84   0.066    -.3550687    .0112379 
     FAC15_1 |   .1201747   .0852748     1.41   0.159    -.0472523    .2876018 
     FAC16_1 |  -.0988568    .105065    -0.94   0.347    -.3051397    .1074261 
       _cons |   6.917565   .6216409    11.13   0.000     5.697046    8.138084 
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Table 11 Tobitregression  Model 1                Number of obs   =        718 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =      97.36 
Prob> chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1379.4275                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0341 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
eeffi |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      FAC1_1 |   .2452917   .1612846     1.52   0.129    -.0713663    .5619497 
      FAC2_1 |  -.1790387   .1214454    -1.47   0.141    -.4174785     .059401 
      FAC3_1 |   .8721598   .1269544     6.87   0.000     .6229039    1.121416 
      FAC4_1 |   .0846084   .1159519     0.73   0.466    -.1430457    .3122624 
      FAC5_1 |   .1622337   .1204936     1.35   0.179    -.0743374    .3988048 
      FAC6_1 |  -.2674167   .1217533    -2.20   0.028    -.5064611   -.0283724 
      FAC7_1 |   .1029888   .1332658     0.77   0.440    -.1586584     .364636 
      FAC8_1 |   .1555653   .1842259     0.84   0.399    -.2061344     .517265 
      FAC9_1 |   .0873401   .1445447     0.60   0.546    -.1964516    .3711317 
     FAC10_1 |   .0765725   .1163305     0.66   0.511    -.1518249    .3049698 
     FAC11_1 |   .0540739   .1178297     0.46   0.646     -.177267    .2854148 
     FAC12_1 |   .0010973   .1220658     0.01   0.993    -.2385606    .2407551 
     FAC13_1 |  -.3025825   .1219253    -2.48   0.013    -.5419643   -.0632007 
     FAC14_1 |  -.3520149   .1240151    -2.84   0.005    -.5954998     -.10853 
     FAC15_1 |   .0865539   .1178371     0.73   0.463    -.1448014    .3179092 
     FAC16_1 |   .1227661   .1239589     0.99   0.322    -.1206084    .3661407 
       _cons |   8.518573   .1182592    72.03   0.000     8.286389    8.750757 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma |   2.894684   .1028509                      2.692752    3.096616 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Obs. summary:        469     uncensored observations 
                       249 right-censored observations  
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Table 12 Tobitregression  Model 2                Number of obs   =        718 
                                                  LR chi2(22)     =     115.33 
Prob> chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1370.4441                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0404 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
eeffi |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          v9 |  -.0001255   .0000626    -2.00   0.045    -.0002485   -2.54e-06 
         v24 |    .027178   .0194566     1.40   0.163    -.0110226    .0653787 
         v33 |   .0002769   .0002727     1.02   0.310    -.0002584    .0008123 
         v36 |   .0080351   .0030575     2.63   0.009     .0020321     .014038 
         v52 |  -.0033727   .0020256    -1.67   0.096    -.0073497    .0006042 
         v20 |  -.0020602   .0026938    -0.76   0.445    -.0073491    .0032287 
      FAC1_1 |   .5158509   .2267894     2.27   0.023     .0705776    .9611242 
      FAC2_1 |   .0398456   .1576042     0.25   0.800     -.269591    .3492822 
      FAC3_1 |   .5809333   .1781987     3.26   0.001     .2310618    .9308047 
      FAC4_1 |   .0421464   .1603008     0.26   0.793    -.2725846    .3568775 
      FAC5_1 |   .2094967   .1204746     1.74   0.082    -.0270405    .4460338 
      FAC6_1 |  -.2033668   .1214637    -1.67   0.095    -.4418461    .0351124 
      FAC7_1 |   .5134836   .2663573     1.93   0.054    -.0094766    1.036444 
      FAC8_1 |   .1786056   .2142781     0.83   0.405    -.2421033    .5993145 
      FAC9_1 |   .1598013   .1776663     0.90   0.369    -.1890248    .5086274 
     FAC10_1 |   .0251549   .1155192     0.22   0.828     -.201653    .2519627 
     FAC11_1 |  -.0020723   .1420317    -0.01   0.988    -.2809343    .2767897 
     FAC12_1 |   .1723573   .1590199     1.08   0.279     -.139859    .4845736 
     FAC13_1 |  -.3875778   .1568318    -2.47   0.014    -.6954979   -.0796577 
     FAC14_1 |  -.2124811   .1400047    -1.52   0.130    -.4873632    .0624011 
     FAC15_1 |   .1871698   .1276434     1.47   0.143    -.0634425    .4377821 
     FAC16_1 |  -.1120871   .1537068    -0.73   0.466    -.4138718    .1896975 
       _cons |   7.388837   .9060634     8.15   0.000     5.609892    9.167783 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma |   2.840359   .1009468                      2.642162    3.038555 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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  Obs. summary:        469   uncensored observations 
                       249 right-censored observations 
What we find is very interesting. It is the revenue indicators in the components which 
play the most important role in explaining differences in efficiencies also. We have reported 
only four sets of regressions but we have attempted many and in all of them one or many of 
the revenue components were significant with a positive sign. This implies that ULBs with 
better revenue generating abilities have higher resource utilization efficiencies. Among the 
revenue components the strongest is that comprising of the collection efficiencies of different 
revenue heads which indicates that the administrative efficiency can drive expenditure 
efficiency in service delivery. Also, it is not the grants or the assigned revenues components 
which were significant but the components comprising of the own revenues and coverage of 
revenue expenditure by own revenues which were significant.  It is also interesting to note 
that the service adequacy and the expenditure-adequacy indicators can also be significant 
but with a negative sign. This indicates that better indicators in terms of coverage of norms or 
higher service delivery or higher expenditures on services are associated with lower 
efficiencies. This implies that the cost component, in achieving the targets in service delivery 
norm, outweighs the gains through better services. Some of the cost and demand indicators 
are also significant with population having a positive sign and density a negative sign.  This 
implies that while higher population is associated with higher efficiencies, cities with lower 
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densities record higher efficiencies. This indicates that scale effect through population is 
active but that through population density is not active in determining higher efficiencies.  
Now we areclear about the relative importance of the indicators explaining fiscal 
health patterns and also inefficiency in expenditure management. We can attempt a set of 
indexation based on the analysis done so far. The efficiency scores are indices of one kind. 
The principal components can be combined into a single index.  Here comes the question of 
how to choose weights. Traditional theory prescribes the use of eigenvalues as weights to be 
applied on the scores generated by the components to each individual.ULB. This has a 
rationale behind it as the eigenvalues captures the extent of variances explained by the 
respective component. We can follow this method and derive the scores. Also, from our 
analysis, we know that there is a dominant role played by the revenue indicators in both the 
steps. So, we can assign the highest weights to the revenue indicators, with a positive 
margin added to the eigenvalue method.  
The last step would be to combine the efficiency indicator and the principal 
component analysis indicator into a composite index. Here we can assign weights according 
to the purpose and use of the indicator. If the emphasis is on service delivery, we give more 
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weightage on the efficiency indicator. If that is not the case, we can give more weightage on 
the principal component analysis indicator2. 
5. Conclusions 
The present paper is an attempt to offer a holistic approach of performance evaluation 
of governments. We propose a three step methodology for a thorough estimation of efficiency 
and fiscal parameters of governments. The advantage of this methodology is that it is less 
demanding as far as data requirements are concerned and can serve the same purpose of 
assigning ranks to governments according to their combined performance on efficiency and 
fiscal health.In the process, we thoroughly analyse the determinants of fiscal patterns and 
efficiency and also assess their interrelationships. The variables affecting both can be 
recognized as the most important ones for performance evaluations of governments and can 
be given more weightage while constructing indices of performance evaluations.  
This methodology can minimize the errors in policy formulations in the sense that it 
assesses performance of governments from different perspectives. In performance based 
grant allocation, the major sources of errors come through the fact that the levels of services 
are overstated which cannot be cross-checked directly through the conditions put forward for 
                                                          
2
We do not elaborate on the results of indexation, scoring and ranking of ULBs in this paper as that would 
make the paper more cumbersome. The issue of ranking and allocation of grants is dealt in another paper. 
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eligibility of these grants. The conditions are broad in nature, based on the steps followed to 
complete certain reform initiatives. They generally fail to capture the true fiscal patterns, 
which is crucial for allocation of grants, apart from the service indicators. For accurate 
estimations of fiscal gaps, the information cost is very high to collect data, particularly to 
estimatea representative effective rate, the correct revenue base and expenditure needs.The 
present methodology is somewhat an improvement over the traditional approach in the sense 
that it provides some checks and measures to arrive at correct assessments of overall fiscal 
patterns of governments. 
An application of this methodology is attempted for the urban local bodies in the state 
of Tamil Nadu in India.  The efficiency and fiscal health patterns are thoroughly analysed for 
all class of cities.  It is interesting to find that the big cities are getting advantage of scale, 
small cities are getting advantage of their size but the medium sized cities are somewhat 
stuck. This calls for policy initiatives particularly oriented for medium sized cities in India, for 
creating higher revenue generation potential by attracting high value residents into their 
jurisdictions. The location of industrial hubs, particularly services, could be one way out. A 
more planned development of the medium sized cities are also called for. 
We find mis-utilisation more dominant in smaller cities. These leakages call for better 
audit systems for municipal accounts. This has been prescribed by different central finance 
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commissions and the second administrative reforms commission also.  Generally, the audit 
process is not very regular in smaller cities.  
A thorough analysis of the fiscal health parameters reveals that the revenue 
generating potential and the related variables are the most important in explaining patterns in 
the fiscal parameters. The collection efficiencies of different tax sources play a prominent role 
condensed in a component to explain fiscal patterns from data.The service adequacy and 
expenditure adequacy indicators also play a role.As a single component, population and 
certain demand side income related variables are also important in explaining variations in 
fiscal patterns. We also find that the revenue related components can also explainthe 
differences in efficiencies of ULBs better.The ULBs which have better revenue related 
characteristics are the ones with higher efficiencies in resource utilization  and service 
delivery. 
This calls for more attention towards the policy and administrative factors related to 
revenue generation and collection. The rates of different revenue sources should be revised 
on a regular basis.  Collection efficiency of different revenue sources and coverage ratio as 
compared to the entire revenue base are important indicators for performance in revenue 
generation. The estimation of base through GIS and other procedures need to be taken more 
seriously. Outsourcing some of these activities to private and other public agencies can 
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facilitate the process. The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission 
(JnNURM)recommendations included all of these but the implementation is yet to be 
completed. 
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Appendix 
 
A Note on Data Envelopment Analysis 
The theoretical foundation of efficiency analysis dates back to Koopmans (1951) who defined 
a point in the commodity space as efficient whenever an increase in the net output of one good 
resulted in a decrease in that of another. This definition is known as the Pareto-Koopmans condition 
for technical efficiency (TE). Debreu’s (1951) concept of coefficient of resource utilization as a 
measure of TE for the economy as a whole (from the point of view of cost of resources), Farrell’s 
(1957) notion of radial contraction of inputs/expansion of outputs from an observed point to the 
frontier (in axiomatic production theory), i.e., the efficiency of a DMU reflect the ability to use the 
inputs in optimal proportion, given their respective prices or to achieve the maximum level of output 
attainable by the state of technology, are all on similar lines. Hoffman (1957) suggested that the dual 
simplex method could be applied to obtain Farrell’s measure of efficiency. This was used in Farrell 
and Fieldhouse (1962).  But the main problem was to cast the fractional program into a linear 
program so that it is solvable. In principle, it maximizes the ratio of total value of outputs to total value 
of inputs subject to the constraint that for each DMU this ratio cannot exceed unity. Charnes, Cooper 
and Rhodes (1978) completed the task of conversion of the fractional program into a linear program 
by selecting suitable weights (which are nothing but the virtual prices of inputs and outputs). A more 
generalized variable returns to scale (VRS) model was developed by Banker, Charnes and Cooper 
(1984).  
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The basic principle of measurement of technical efficiency is the distance of the point of 
operation of a decision making unit from that projected on the frontier. Two factors viz. the way the 
frontier is constructed and the way the distance is measured, make one method of estimation different 
from the other. The parametric approach requires the imposition of a specific functional form for a 
production frontier and some assumptions like independently and identically normally distributed 
errors which have to be uncorrelated with the independent variables. In contrast the non parametric 
approach does not require any functional form. It is based on a set of behavioral assumptions 
regarding production. Taking information from data on inputs and outputs the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) method generates a discrete piecewise frontier by optimizing on each individual 
observation given the set of Pareto efficient DMUs or the peers. The technical efficiency scores are 
derived as the ratio of the actual output to the ideal output specified by the generated frontier.   
For each family of parametric or non parametric specifications, the estimation can be done 
through mathematical programming or econometric techniques. The distance between the point on 
which a decision making unit actually operates and the point on the frontier on which it should have 
operated can be measured as a radial or a non radial characterization. In this discussion we would 
consider radial measures. We would consider the nonparametric method of DEA which uses a linear 
programming principle for estimating technical efficiency and is deterministic in nature.  
Figure 1A gives a diagram to show input efficiency graphically. Suppose we have four firms A, 
B, C and D of which C and D are the efficient firms operating on the frontier.  
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Figure-A1: Input- Oriented Radial and Slack Efficiency  
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 With the help of observed input-output data the piecewise linear isoquant (SS/) can be 
constructed (FigureA.1)3 Firms A and B represent two inefficient firms. So, the extent of their 
technical inefficiency will be 
OA
OA/  and
OB
OB /  respectively. But it is not the ultimate efficient point 
because one could reduce the input 2x  by the amount CA/ and still produce the same output. 
Therefore, this movement along isoquant is known as the input slack. On the other hand in case of 
firm B only radial movement is enough to ensure efficient input-output combination. No slack 
movement is required here. Similarly the concept of output slack can be described.   
Model 1 is the input version of the efficiency with slacks given as: 
Min:         
Subject to:   
                   
 
                                                          
3
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Where:       is free. 
 , indicates the output and input slack and  is any pre-assigned positive number, however 
small. Positive sign means output should be increased and negative sign means input should be 
decreased.  
 It is the treatment of slacks that motivates the extension of the basic model to different 
stages. A single stage DEA we can solve a linear program in model 1 and calculate slacks residually.   
Model 1 can be executed as a two stage or a multi stage model. In a two stage DEA, first, the 
input efficiency scores are derived and then a stage follows where corresponding to these efficiency 
scores the optimal slacks are estimated for each ULB.  This is done by estimating  in  eq  1.1 in the 
first stage. In the second stage the non radial movement on the efficient frontier is achieved by 
optimising the slack variables in eq 1.2. 
However, the presence or absence of weakly efficient DMUs makes the procedure a little different.  
A DMU is efficient iff  
=1 and = 0; and (or) =0  for all i and j; 
A DMU is weakly efficient iff 
=1 and  = =0  for some i and j; 
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We do not know before the calculations whether weakly efficient DMUs are present. In the 
absence of weakly efficient DMUs, we can estimate the optimal slacks using eq 1.3 in the second 
stage.  
Min:         
Subject to:   
                   
                   
               
Where:       is free. 
Max:         
Subject to:   
                   
                   
               
Where:       is free. 
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 A two-stage procedure can suffer from two shortcomings depending upon the dataset and the 
nature of the problem to solve. Optimisation of slacks in the second stage can lead to maximization 
instead of minimization of slacks in this procedure. Also, the solutions are sensitive to the units in 
which the data is expressed. To overcome these difficulties, a multi-stage procedure is preferred 
which conduct a sequence of radial linear programs to make the necessary corrections.  However, 
whether we need to go beyond the two stage procedure could be a matter of choice or an empirical 
question, which depends on the structure of the dataset and the problem to be addressed. In our 
case, the solution of a multi-stage model and a two stage model does not differ as the dataset does 
not permit us to run the program beyond the second stage. 
 
A Note on Principal Component Analysis 
The concept of generating components through data reduction is simple yet elegant.  If we 
have a data matrix X with n observations and p variables, the entire structure can be looked at from 
two different spaces, the sample space or the variable space, ie to say there can be n 
observations/points in Rp or p variables/points in Rn. Reduction of dimensionality is achieved by an 
algorithm which searches for the axis used to project the samples that minimizes the loss of 
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information or variability of the cloud of points. The variability is captured by the vector length and the 
correlation by the angle between two vectors for standardized variables. All the variability in the data 
can be considered for analysis. The components are generated in order of the degree of explanatory 
factor of variations by them. For instance, the first component explains the biggest share of variation. 
An iterative process is run by repeating this, leaving out each component after its performance. 
Theoretically, the number of components derived can be equal to the number of variables but the 
components explaining the highest shares of variations are chosen and those explaining considerably 
lesser proportions are ignored. The components are retained by ranking them according to the 
eigenvalues attached to them. A rule of thumb for retaining components is setting a cut-off for 
eigenvalues at 1, i.e we consider those components whose eigenvalues are greater than or equal to 
1.    
Principal components are derived in two steps. The components generated in the first set of 
iterations, with orthogonal transformation of the variables into components, might not give 
interpretable results.  Herein comes the concept of rotation. This is a fine tuning process in order to 
make the results more interpretable without changing the fundamental relations in the data. The 
rotation of the constructed components in the second stage can be orthogonal or oblique depending 
upon the nature of the problem. In social science we find oblique rotations more practical as there is 
always some correlation between a set of variables used in these problems. After deriving the 
components we can derive the scores as weighted averages of these components, weights being the 
respective eigenvalues or the measures of variance associated with each component 
